: Results from 2015 YouGov data. Reported are unstandardized coe cients with standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls (party identification, education, age, gender, place of residence, attachment to the nation, political interest) and cuto points of the ordinal models not shown.
Alternative Explanations for Response Variability (2015)
When testing whether individuals with mixed conceptions of national identity exhibit higher response variability than individuals with ideal-type conceptions we assume such response variability is due to internal conflict and di culty in shaping an opinion. However, high response variability may also be due to other factors such as uncertainty or indi erence. An individual who is uncertain 'does not have enough information to form a reliable opinion, but may arrive at one when provided with additional information' (?: 3). An individual is indi erent when he or she has neither positive nor negative considerations towards an attitude object (?). ? point out that if high response variability is indeed due to internalized conflict, additional information should not reduce response variability as more information will not reduce uncertainty, but rather increase the salience of the conflicting considerations. We therefore test whether the e ect of mixed conceptions on response variability is stronger among individuals who are politically informed, than among individuals who are not politically informed. We use a variable capturing political interest as a proxy for having political information. Involvement/sophistication denotes the extent to which citizens' political cognitions are 'numerous, cut a wide substantive swath, and are highly organized, or "constrained"' (?: 332). We believe that political interest is a reasonable-although perhaps not perfect-indicator, given that it is one of the main determinants of involvement/sophistication thus defined (?). As can be seen in Table A7 , individuals with mixed conceptions of national identity exhibit higher response variability when they are politically interested, than when they are not. This goes against the idea that uncertainty is driving response variability. Figure A2 further illustrates this e ect. 
Justification of control variables and Discussion on Identities and Values
In the main paper we include a number of control variables in order to control for potential omitted variable bias. In the following, we ellaborate on the justification for their inclusion:
Identifying with a certain party may a ect both conceptions of the nation, as well as the certainty with which an opinion is held. Feeling strongly attached to a party may also have such an e ect, since such individuals are more likely to form opinions based on party cues. We therefore control for strength of party identification. Feeling attached to the nation may also be linked to both conceptions and response variability, independently of the content of this conception. We also control for political interest to make sure that we are not capturing 'non-attitudes' among individuals with mixed conceptions. Since attitude moderation is an alternative explanation for ambivalence (?) we include a scale of ideological extremeity (where the lowest value is the median of the ideological scale). We also control for socio-demographic variables and party identification.
In some of our model specifications, we also control for political values. The conviction that a true compatriot should have democratic convictions is conceptually distinct from having internalized these convictions as part of one's personal identity. But the social identity approach predicts that when a national identity becomes psychologically salient category prototypes are activated and become guiding principles for group members' thoughts and actions. What follows from this reasoning for our work? The crucial question is whether we should control for, e.g., universalism in our analysis. Doing so might mean over-controlling, given that related values-such as tolerance-are a crucial element in the mechanism that we assume connects conceptions of national identity and ambivalence. Not controlling for these values might mean allowing for an omitted variable bias. In e ect, we present results with and without such controls (see Tables 3 and 4 ). The results remain very similar. We acknowledge, however, that this nexus is not well understood and more research is needed to disentangle the relationship between the cognitive representation of group prototypes, group norms, and norms/values in general.
More specifically, we include two values from Shalom Schwartz's inventory of universal values (????), namely universalism and tradition. Individuals who score high on universalism seek social justice for all people, irrespective of their economic, social, or political background. High priority of universalism may induce individuals both to embrace a civic conception of the nation and show solidarity with refugees. Second, individuals who score high on tradition show respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self. As such, high priority of tradition may induce individuals to embrace an ethno-cultural conception of the nation and be reserved toward foreigners, given that Germany has traditionally been an ethnoculturally homogeneous nation that only recently experienced significant immigration. For the e ects of these universal values on attitudes toward immigration and ethno-cultural outgroups, see, e.g., ? and ?. Given previous research, which shows that (political) values may induce ambivalence (?), we also include an interaction between universalism and tradition-individuals who think that both universalims and tradition are important may feel ambivalent about immigrants and refugees, independently from their conceptions of the nation. Explicitly controlling for values thus represents a strong test of the uniqueness of the identity conception e ects, given that some people are likely to exhibit these values because they identify with the nation and are motivated to adopt ingroup norms. The civic conception of national identity, in particular, is closely related to values, as it defines national membership in terms of having internalized certain liberal values. From this point of view, considerations based on the civic conception are essentially considerations based on values, but the motivation to act on them stems from the identity component. At the same time, values may be relevant for people's attitude formation irrespective of whether they are seen as constitutive of the national ingroup. Previous research has indeed shown that values may shape policy attitudes (?) and induce ambivalence (?). Gender Dummy variable, coded 1 "female" and 0 "male"
Marginal E ect of National Identity Conceptions on
State of residence Dummy variable, coded 1 "East Germany" (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, SachsenAnhalt, Thüringen) and 0 "West Germany" (the remaining 11 states)
Additional information about the YouGov and GLES surveys
Response rates YouGov uses a system of inviting people in which panelist will receive an email that includes a url link asking them to take a survey. When they click on the link they are sent to the survey currently in field that requires their demographic breakdown the most. This means that there is no response rate for individual surveys available as such. The average response rate for YouGov surveys fielded in Germany during the time of this survey (July 2015) was 21 percent.
Participation rate in the first wave of the GLES campaign panel was 25 percent (Roßteutscher et al. 2018a: 22-23) .
Incentives
YouGov respondents who completed the questionnaire received an equivalent of €1.5.
The GLES panel survey used a complex incentive scheme. E.g., incentives varied across waves and respondents, depending on survey length and number of previously completed waves. Incentives usually varied between €1.5 and €2. For details, see the study description (Roßteutscher et al. 2018a: 14-15) GLES campaign panel waves used in the analysis We analyse all seven waves of the 2017 GLES campaign panel survey that are available in the most current publicly available data set (version 5.0.0; see Roßteutscher et al. 2018b ) and include the immigration item. This applies to waves 1-4 and 6-8. The following table reports details about field time, the total respective sample sizes, and the items we use from each of these waves. Roßteutscher et al. (2018a) . 
Additional findings

